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ECONOMIC JUSTICE: COPYRIGHT OWNERS, PERFORMERS,
AND USERS
EDWARD SAMUELS*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, most of the literature in the field of copyright has
focused upon the rights of copyright owners versus the rights of copy-
right users. Although many others involved in the field of copyright
seem to think that the balance has shifted in recent years either too
much in favor of the copyright owners, or too much in favor of the
copyright users, I believe that Congress has achieved a basically fair
balance between the two extremes.
What I’d like to explore today, however, is a different perspective
that generally doesn’t receive a lot of attention. I’m talking about the
role of performers of copyrighted works, primarily recording artists. In
theory, musicians are creators, or at least contribute to the creation, of
many of the works that we enjoy. Music is written to be performed: it is
practically worthless without the talented people who convert the ab-
stract “musical” compositions into the performances that we hear and
enjoy, either live or through recordings. So you might expect that cop-
yright law would protect these co-creators of the works.
Yet, the sad fact is that musicians have not been served well by the
laws of copyright. Although performers are creators, they usually per-
form other people’s works. Under the laws of copyright, their interests
are generally subordinate to the rights of the composers of the music
they perform and to the rights of the recording companies that control
the creation of the physical recordings.
There are three major themes that emerge from the history of
how copyright law treats performers of musical works. First, it has not
protected the performers very well. Second, there have been several
developments that were designed to create better rights for those who
create sound recordings. And third, for various reasons, the perform-
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ers have not usually gotten the benefits of such developments. Due
partly to recent organizing and lobbying efforts by the recording artists
themselves, the situation may be changing.
PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN MUSIC
Music wasn’t protected under federal copyright law in the United
States until 1831. In that year, Congress extended copyright to include
music; but the right only covered the printing or sale of sheet music. In
1897, Congress for the first time created a performance right in musi-
cal works. This performance right granted the composers the exclusive
right to “perform” (or to license for performance) their music pub-
licly.1 This amendment was great for the composers, who were thus
encouraged to write music; but it didn’t protect the rights of perform-
ers, who in fact now had to pay licenses to publicly perform the songs
that were written by others.
RIGHT TO MAKE SOUND RECORDINGS
Back in 1909, Congress extended copyright in musical works to
include the exclusive right to make mechanical reproductions of the
music. However, fearing that a few companies might buy up many of
the copyrights in musical works and extend their monopoly in musical
works to a monopoly in sound recordings, Congress provided for what
has come to be known as a “compulsory license”. Under the compul-
sory license, any composer of a musical work can decide whether or
not to allow anyone to make a recording of the song, and may charge
the first performer whatever they can for the privilege of making the
first recording. But after that first recording, anyone else may make
their own recording of the same song for a set fee, initially set in the
1909 statute at 2 cents per song, and gradually increased to 8 cents per
song in 2002.2
In theory, the compulsory license helps performers by allowing
them to make sound recordings of songs at set fees, so that the per-
formers have access to the whole body of musical works when they
make their recordings. However, the sound recording compulsory li-
1. Today, musical works are protected under 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2002), and the
exclusive right to perform such works publicly is protected under 17 U.S.C. § 106
(2002).
2. The 1909 provision was contained in the prior 17 U.S.C. § 1(e), and is contin-
ued in the current 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2002).
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cense can backfire on recording artists in several ways. First, most re-
cording contracts provide that the artist has to pay the compulsory
licensing fees from the artist’s portion of the profits, which can fre-
quently swallow up a large portion of the artist’s potential profits. Sec-
ond, the standard record contract treats as a “controlled composition”
a musical work that was written by the performing artist, and usually
provides that the artist, as composer, receives a lower fee for the “com-
pulsory license” than would a separate composer. And third, if a per-
former records a hit, the compulsory license allows other performers
to record the same song, sometimes with greater success than the origi-
nal recording artist.
SOUND RECORDINGS
In 1972, largely in response to rampant record and tape piracy,
Congress provided that sound recordings were eligible for copyright,
in addition to the musical works that existed on the sound recordings.
Since the performers are co-creators of the sound recordings, you
might expect that they would end up owning at least a portion of the
“sound recording” copyright. But that’s not the way it works in the
music business.
The culprit that undermines the rights of performers in this case
is the “work made for hire” doctrine. Most standard recording con-
tracts (as well as contracts in some other industries) provide that per-
formers are “hired” to create a copyrighted work that is owned by the
company. In 1976, Congress tightened the copyright statute’s defini-
tion of “works for hire” to assure that fewer works would be treated as
works for hire.3 In particular, the doctrine would only apply for actual
employees of companies, and for “independent contractors” in certain
specified contexts. These specified contexts did not list “sound record-
ings,” so that a party preparing a sound recording would not be treated
as a worker for hire unless actually employed by the sound recording
company (which most recording artists are not).
Notwithstanding the tightening of the rules, the recording indus-
try pretty much continued to treat most recording artist contracts as
“works for hire.” In 1999, the industry even got an amendment passed
by Congress that added “sound recordings” to the list of works that
could be treated as works for hire. After complaints by music artists,
3. The works for hire rule is embodied in 17 U.S.C. § 201(b), and in the defini-
tion of “works made for hire” under 17 U.S.C. §101.
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Congress repealed the change in 2000, leading to one of the most con-
voluted definitions in the current act. The definition of “work made
for hire” provides that consideration shall not be given to the amend-
ment or its repeal in defining the term, and the paragraph “shall be
interpreted as if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made For Hire and
Copyright Corrections Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellec-
tual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999 . . .
were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or awareness
by the Congress at any time of any judicial determinations.”4 What?
You can excuse the recording artists if they are a bit cynical about Con-
gress’s passing the amendment in the first place.
In any event, most recording artist contracts provide that if the
work for any reason is not a “work for hire”, the performer still grants
any rights of copyright to the recording company that finances the re-
cording. The performers get whatever payment or royalties they are in
a position to negotiate with the recording companies. The successful
artists get pretty good payments, and the unsuccessful artists make
whatever deals they have to make to get the companies to sign them
on.
LEGAL DOCTRINES OUTSIDE OF COPYRIGHT: CONTRACTS
In addition to the works-for-hire provision, one of the onerous
provisions included in most sound recording contracts is one obligat-
ing the performer to produce the next two, five, seven or more albums
for the same recording company. The recording companies argue that
this provision is necessary to protect their investments in musical
groups. Since many or most musical groups don’t start making money
for years, the recording companies would not invest in new musical
groups if they didn’t have some assurance that they could make money
from the later works when the groups make it big.
Recently, several music groups held a “protest” concert opposite
the Grammy awards, lobbying for a change in California contract law.
Under California law, service contracts are generally limited to a seven-
year term.5 (This is the law that eventually freed many actors from the
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of “work made for hire”).
5. The California Labor Code provides:
“(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), a contract to render
personal service, other than a contract of apprenticeship . . . may not be
enforced against the employee beyond seven years from the commence-
ment of service under it. . . .” Cal. Lab. Code § 2855 (2002).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\46-3-4\NLR424.txt unknown Seq: 5 20-FEB-03 10:22
2002-2003] ECONOMIC JUSTICE: COPYRIGHT 753
old “movie studio” system, under which actors had been tied up in
long-term contracts with their studios, and were unable to obtain “free
agency” to work for other studios.)6 The music industry, however, man-
aged to get an amendment to the state law. Under that amendment, if
a recording artist has a contract that requires the making of a certain
number of recordings, and if the recording artist invokes the law to
terminate the contract after the seven-year period, the “employer” may
sue for the nondelivery of the remaining recordings.7 This amend-
ment effectively made the seven-year term unavailable to most record-
ing artists.
So, one way for artists to protect their negotiating position with
the record companies is by specific state laws that prohibit particular
unconscionable terms, such as long-term service contracts that bind
the performers to a particular company. Other general doctrines of
contract law, such as the doctrine of unconscionability, could also be
used to police against harsh contracts in particular cases.8
6. See De Haviland v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 153 P.2d 983 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1944).
7. The California Labor Code provides:
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a):
(1) Any employee who is a party to a contract to render personal service in
the production of phonorecords in which sounds are first fixed, as defined
in Section 101 of Title 17 of the United States Code, may not invoke the
provisions of subdivision (a) without first giving written notice to the em-
ployer in accordance with Section 1020 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
specifying that the employee from and after a future date certain specified
in the notice will no longer render service under the contract by reason of
subdivision (a).
(2) Any party to such a contract shall have the right to recover damages for
a breach of the contract occurring during its term in an action commenced
during or after its term, but within the applicable period prescribed by law.
(3) In the event a party to such a contract is, or could contractually be,
required to render personal service in the production of a specified quan-
tity of the phonorecords and fails to render all of the required service prior
to the date specified in the notice provided in paragraph (1), the party
damaged by the failure shall have the right to recover damages for each
phonorecord as to which that party has failed to render service in an action
which, notwithstanding paragraph (2), shall be commenced within 45 days
after the date specified in the notice.
Cal. Lab. Code § 2855 (2002).
8. As the California protest demonstrates, sometimes collective action is more
effective than individual actions. The protest concert was sponsored by the Recording
Artists’ Coalition, a new organization designed to promote and lobby for recording
artists’ rights. You can find out about the organization and some of its lobbying efforts
available at www.recordingartistscoalition.com.
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ROYALTIES FROM DIGITAL AUDIO HOME RECORDING
In 1992, Congress passed the Digital Audio Home Recording Act.
It created another compulsory license, this time to provide a fund of
money to compensate copyright owners whose works were being cop-
ied using the new digital audio recording devices. The revenues raised
from the compulsory license would be split 1/3 for the owners of the
copyrights of songs, and 2/3 for the “sound recordings fund”. For the
first time in the history of copyright, a certain percentage of this fund
(a bit over 40% of the sound recording fund) was to be paid not to the
copyright owners of the sound recordings, but to the “musicians” and
“vocalists” who performed on the sound recordings, regardless of their
pre-existing contractual arrangements.9 The only problem with this
amendment was that very few people bought the digital audio record-
ing devices contemplated in the statute. Congress apparently did not
foresee that most home recording of sound recordings would take
place using home computers, which were not covered by the
amendment.10
ROYALTIES FROM INTERNET WEBCASTING
Realizing that the new technology that was catching on like crazy
was not the digital audio home recorders, but the Internet, Congress
in 1995 passed the Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act. This
act for the first time provided for an exclusive digital performance
right for sound recordings. The amendment, among other things, gov-
erns the “webcasting,” or “streaming,” of music on the Internet. Al-
though quite complicated, the amendment does provide for a limited
compulsory license for certain non-interactive streaming of music on
the Internet. For only the second time in history, Congress included
“musicians” and “vocalists” as parties entitled to participate in the
funds generated from a compulsory license.11 The musicians and vo-
calists will receive half of the money generated from the webcasting of
sound recordings under the compulsory license. Curiously, however,
9. The Digital Audio Home Recording Act added chapter 10 to 17 U.S.C. The
allocation of funds is provided in 17 U.S.C. §1006 (b).
10. See Ass’n of America v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding that the amendment did not apply to the Rio MP3 player, one of the
most popular new technologies for recording music).
11. The relevant portion of the Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act is 17
U.S.C. § 114 (g), setting out the percentages to be shared by the various parties under
the new compulsory license.
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the recording artists are relegated to their usually less favorable con-
tract if the webcasting is “interactive”, or otherwise subject to full li-
censing by the sound recording copyright owner.
The copyright arbitration royalty panel recently recommended
what it considered “reasonable” fees for the webcasts covered by the
compulsory licenses. These amounted to 14/100 cent per transmission
of a sound recording (or 7/100 cent if the webcast is of a regular radio
broadcast of the sound recording). This amounts to about 2 to 3 cents
per hour per person to whom the sound recording is transmitted.
Many commentators, however, arguing that these fees will add up to
hundreds of thousands of dollars for some Internet sites, have pro-
tested loudly that the rates are too high, and have urged the Librarian
of Congress not to accept the panel’s rates.12
So, the recording artists finally get a piece of the pie through a
compulsory license that is meant to generate some modest revenue,
and what happens? Everybody’s screaming that the fees are too high,
and that they should be set low enough to encourage the liberal devel-
opment of new “business models” for delivering music on the Internet.
If the Librarian of Congress, or Congress itself, should pull back on
the fees, it will be the performers, again, who will lose out.
CONCLUSION
Performers to some extent have been indirect beneficiaries of the
copyrights owned by the recording companies, since the performers
do depend, to a large extent, on the income generated by the sale of
their recordings. But the performers more often than not end up on
the short end of the revenue flow.
12. On July 8, 2002, the Library of Congress issued a final rule and order adopting
a uniform rate of 7/100 cent for all webcast transmissions coming under the compul-
sory license. See Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms for the Digital Perform-
ance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45,240 (July 8,
2002) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261), available at http://www.copyright.gov/
fedreg/2002/67fr45239.html. On December 2, 2002, President Bush signed into law
the Small Webcaster Settlement Agreement of 2002 (P.L. 107-321); and on December
24, 2002, the Copyright Office published a notification of  agreement under that act
(available at www.copyright.gov/carp/webcasting_rates.html). The new rates, negoti-
ated between Sound Exchange and Voice of Webcasters, allows eligible small webcasters
to pay an alternative (presumably lesser) royalty rate, amounting to 8% of the web-
caster’s gross revenues, or 5% of the webcaster’s expenses during the relevant period,
whichever is greater, with other limitations designed to provide at least a minimum fee
of $500 for 1998, and $2,000 per year for 1999 through 2002.
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I don’t expect you to fully understand the complicated copyright
provisions based upon this cursory description. (You might take a look
at my book, The Illustrated Story of Copyright, for a more thorough review
of some of the copyright principles described briefly here.) But per-
formers have had some success in getting Congress to at least consider
the impact of copyright laws on them, and in limited contexts to actu-
ally allow the recording artists to participate in funds realized from the
creation of new rights in the digital performance of sound recordings.
I encourage Congress, the state legislatures, the courts, and the record-
ing companies to be sympathetic to the complaints made by sound
recording artists, so that the artists can at least share in some of the
revenue flowing from their contributions.
